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THE BAR IN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF
ELITISM IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
Philip S. Stamatakos*
Upon the Bar depends the continuity of constitutional
government & the perpetuity of the republic itself.'
Americans must conduct an intelligent debate about the
place of equality, egalitarianism, and community values in
western society. Three forces, liberal democracy, the free
market, and science, have converged in the twentieth century
and threaten to atomize society, changing the state from a
community to a collection of individuals. All three forces
emphasize the primacy of the individual and therefore
threaten many traditional institutions founded on com-
munitarian principles. In particular, traditional concepts of
community are under pressure from the excesses of
egalitarianism, economic specialization, and the concept that
knowledge and truth reside in each individual. This phenom-
enon raises urgent questions for the Bar2 because of lawyers'
special access to and control over the law, the mechanism that
governs relations between people. Given its relationship to
the law, what should be the Bar's role, if any, in shaping
American society? If, by virtue of its power over the instru-
ments used to attain and protect individual rights, the Bar is
viewed as elite, what is the role of elitism in a liberal
democracy?
Immanuel Kant said that "[wie must not expect a good
constitution because those who make it are moral men.
Rather, it is because of a good constitution that we may expect
a society composed of moral men."3 Kant's statement evokes
an image of the good state as a perpetual motion machine
which, once set in motion, will run eternally, like clockwork.
Kant's vision of society, however, cannot be entirely accurate.
* B.A. 1985, University of Michigan; M.A. 1987, University of Toronto; J.D.
1993, University of Michigan. Associate, McKenna & Cuneo, Washington, D.C.
1. Engraving on the walls of the University of Michigan Law School.
2. Throughout this essay, I use the word "Bar" to refer to the practicing
members of the legal profession.
3. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 152 (1961) (quoting Immanuel Kant).
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The foundations of society and the state must be buttressed
continuously, generation after generation, to serve the com-
monwealth and to avoid societal decay.4
If the excesses of liberal democracy, the free market, and
science are weakening societal institutions, who then must
stymie the dissolution of society? A recent response from the
legal community has been "certainly not lawyers!" According
to Grant Gilmore,
[als lawyers, we will do well to be on guard against any
suggestion that, through law, our society can be reformed,
purified or saved. The function of law, in a society like our
own, is altogether more modest and less apocalyptic. It is
to provide a mechanism for the settlement of disputes in
the light of broadly conceived principles on whose sound-
ness, it must be assumed, there is a general consensus
among us.
5
Gilmore's assertion is subject to attack on two grounds.
First, we cannot assume, as Gilmore seems to, that a general
and unchanging consensus exists among citizens. Consensus
on issues, like the values upon which consensus is founded,
must be nurtured. This is, in part, the role of the law. Be-
cause laws apply equally to all citizens in democracies, even
citizens who disagree with a statute's purposes and effects
must abide by its restrictions. Laws therefore can condition
both behavior and thought and thereby may be instrumental
in molding community values, building consensus, and promot-
ing societal reform.6 Second, although Gilmore minimizes its
import, the law's function as a mechanism for dispute resolu-
tion is vital. The peaceful settlement of disputes-the prin-
cipled and judicious allocation of resources to individuals with
conflicting claims-is in great measure the cornerstone of
4. Freud recognized the delicate nature of society and attributed its fragile
character primarily to individual aggression. In Civilization and Its Discontents, he
wrote that civilization was perpetually threatened with disintegration as a result of
"primary mutual hostility [between] human beings." SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION
AND ITS DISCONTENTS 69 (James Strachey ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1989) (1930).
Given the threat that civilization may dissolve, statecraft should be viewed as the
struggle to maintain and improve upon societal bonds.
5. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 109 (1977).
6. See GEORGE F. WILL, STATECRAFT AS SOULCRAFT: WHAT GOVERNMENT DOES
19-20 (1983).
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civilization. It constitutes a recognition that people will have
conflicting claims to limited resources and that those claims
will be resolved, not by brute force or an arbitrary system of
justice, but by law, a body of precepts which are the ex-
pression of general accord.7
The continuity of constitutional government and the
perpetuity of the Republic itself rests to a considerable extent
upon the Bar. Lawyers, as the standard-bearers of the Con-
stitution, carry the sacred trust of the nation.' "The legal
profession is a public profession. Lawyers are public servants.
They are stewards of all the legal rights and obligations of all
the citizens."9 Lawyers inescapably hold an elite position in
American society because of the nature of their work.' ° In
Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville recognized the
special place of lawyers when he stated that "[ilf I were asked
where I place the American aristocracy, I should reply without
hesitation ... that it ... occupies the judicial bench and the
bar."" The history of the Bar in the United States has been
the struggle of an intellectual and power elite defining its role
in a society whose first axiom is that all people are created
equal. The history of the Bar also parallels society's struggle
to define its values and to determine who, if anyone, should
create and protect those values.
7. Sigmund Freud notes the grand importance of the law in society: "The first
requisite of civilization, therefore, is that ofjustice-that is, the assurance that a law
once made will not be broken in favor of an individual." FREUD, supra note 4, at 49.
8. See generally Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, Professional
Responsibility Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159-62 (1958) ("The
lawyer's role imposes on him a trusteeship for the integrity of those fundamental
processes of government and self-government upon which the successful functioning
of our society depends."); Marc Galanter & J. T. Knight, When Bush Sang Praises of
Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 12, 1992, at 13-14 (quoting from a speech given by then-
Vice President Bush on Aug. 10, 1981, addressing the perception that lawyers have
a special role in American society vis-&-vis the Constitution).
9. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES at vii
(1953).
10. The literature and rules of the American Bar Association (ABA) frequently
refer to lawyers' special role in supporting a democratic form of governance. For
example, the Preamble to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility states that
"l]awyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society.'
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1981); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities (1992) ("A
lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen
having special responsibility for the quality of justice.").
11. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 125 (Richard D. Heffner
ed., Penguin Books 1984) (1840).
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A dynamic exists between the law and the milieu from
which it comes. The law and the Bar are a reflection of socie-
ty. 12 Oliver Wendell Holmes posited that "the life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience." 3 Holmes probab-
ly would agree with the modern notion that the law does not
espouse principles by which people ought to live, but "refers to
how most men behave most of the time." 4 Workable stan-
dards of judgment depend upon the morality of those being
judged; the excellence toward which the law is able to propel
the citizenry is limited by the citizenry's moral fabric. "Legal
history is a chapter of social history, not a self-contained
entity." 5
Likewise, a society is, in part, a reflection of its law. Value-
less laws can drag a society toward nihilism. Enlightened
laws can teach excellence in action and thought, building and
maintaining a sense of community and nurturing civic-minded
citizens. The Bar has a responsibility to transcend the soil
from which it sprouts and raise the aim and actions of citizens
through its justice system. The extent to which law increases
enlightenment or deterioration, however, is dependent upon
the nature of the civic body with which law interacts.
The Bar has a special responsibility, or duty, as the
caretaker of the law and the protector of rights. Its charge is
to lead the people by example. As a result of its unique role,
the Bar is elite, and the elements of elitism necessary for the
proper fulfillment of its mission should be preserved.
Part I of this Note argues that liberal democracy, the free
market, and science have contributed to the increasing
12. Cf. EDWARD C. LINDEMAN, SOCIAL DISCOVERY 223 (1925) ("The leader is a
stimulus, but he is also a response."). American presidents' relationships with the
Washington, D.C. power structure exemplifies this phenomena in a liberal democracy.
On the one hand, presidents are "of the people": they come from the same place as
their constituents, they hold many of the same views as their constituents, and they
are elected by those constituents. When leading, the president is constrained by his
constituents and their representatives. On the other hand, presidents also guide
their constituents. One senator has explained that "lelvery new president comes with
a promise to change things as we know it. The actual results are that they change
Washington and they are changed by Washington." Dan Balz, Changing the Capital,
but More So the Man, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1994, at Al, A6 (quoting Senator John
Breaux).
13. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown & Co. 1949)
(1881).
14. WILL, supra note 6, at 41.
15. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 8 (1976).
856
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atomization of American society. When each person and her
views are glorified, universal standards of good become un-
dermined, values become relative, and a sense of community
becomes evanescent. Part II argues that individualism is
incapable of accounting for the commonweal and therefore is
inherently amoral, because morality is concerned largely with
determining when an individual's will should be subservient
to the will of others. Part III considers the nature of elitism
and equality, and attributes the demise of elitist institutions
in America to the rise of individualism and egalitarianism.
When liberal democracy, bolstered by the free market and
science, overturned discriminatory institutions of the past, it
rightfully eliminated the immoral excesses of institutional
elitism. Unfortunately, liberal democracy did so without
discretion, discrediting not only the immoral aspects of elitism
but its desirable aspects as well. The ethic of service to others
that is the most sacred quality of the legal profession therefore
is threatened. Moreover, the destruction of elitist institutions
has left a vacuum that has not been filled. The country there-
fore needs a force that promotes a sense of community and
embodies an ethos of service to others.
Finally, Part IV argues that the Bar is a distinctive public
calling which engenders special access to, and control over, the
instruments of government and a unique ability to affect
private rights. By virtue of this elite position, the Bar has a
moral responsibility to serve the public. The Bar should fulfill
its duties by countering the atomizing influences of liberal
democracy, the free market, and science through the example
of service to others.
I. THE LIBERAL DEMOCRAT AS THE SPOILED CHILD:
THE ADVENT OF INDIVIDUALISM AND THE
NIHILISM OF VALUE RELATIVITY
To the gods, all things are possible.
- Greek proverb.
Deities, like emboldened revolutionaries and liberal
democrats, have little need for the past. A deity is sufficient
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:4
unto itself, self-contained, omnipotent. Alexis de Tocqueville
observed that "people reign in the American political world as
the Deity does in the Universe." 6 In this regard, the habits
of American youth are revealing. Consider a young person
wearing a portable headset. He strolls, hermetically sealed off
from the world outside, pumping into his head only those
noises that he chooses. His primary concern is himself; others
may concern him, but only if they disturb his pleasure or offer
to increase it. His individualism is critical in shaping his view
toward history. History has little to offer him because it is
largely the history of human interaction and group consensus
about values-two interrelated phenomena that are irrelevant
to him. History, however, is a treasure. Today's challenge is
to make democratic society more aware of its moral geneol-
ogy.17
The person with the headset and the millions of others like
him know of only one standard of beauty: their own.'" They
are the product of three historical forces: liberal democracy,
the free market, and science. The primary fault of liberal
democracy, the free market, and science is that they tend to
produce a society that takes insufficient cognizance of the need
to nurture a collectivist democracy where each person is aware
of their duty to one other. All three forces undermine a socie-
ty in which service to others is honored and community values
are prized. Each force therefore warrants closer examination.
A. Liberal Democracy and the Excesses of Tolerance
Liberal democratic theory teaches that before people lived in
society, they lived in the state of nature. In this state of
nature, people were in constant conflict with each other, "that
condition which is called WarU.""9  Each person, however,
possessed unfettered enjoyment of his "natural
16. ToCQUEVILLE, supra note 11, at 58.
17. "The aim should be to nurture a sense of continuity with the rich tradition
of political philosophy, from Aristotle to Burke." WILL, supra note 6, at 163.
18. Tocqueville wrote that "I think that in no country in the civilized world is
less attention paid to philosophy than in the United States .... [Elach American
appeals only to the individual effort of his own understanding." Id. at 143.
19. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 185 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books
1984) (1651). Hobbes posits that in the state of nature, the life of humanity is
"solitary, poorfl, nasty, brutish, and short." Id. at 186.
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liberties"-freedom, equality, and independence-each of
which focus on the individual. 0 In order to achieve peace,21
people transcended the state of nature through a "social
contract" with each other.22  The social contract, or com-
monwealth, provides the safety that is lacking in the state of
23nature. Such safety, however, comes at a price. People trade
24their natural liberties for civil liberties, which are natural
liberties subject to the limitations of the general will of the
commonwealth.25 Although people allow their natural liberties
to be tempered when in society, the ultimate object of liberal
democracy is to preserve people's natural liberties to the
greatest extent possible. Jean-Jacques Rousseau stated that
the objective of the social contract is "to find a form of associa-
tion which will defend the person and goods of each member
with the collective force of all, and under which each in-
dividual, while uniting himself with the others, obeys no one
but himself, and remains as free as before."26
Three aspects of liberal democratic thought are troublesome.
First, liberal democratic theory suggests that individuals
existed in the state of nature and that a commonwealth is but
a congregation of individuals, an unnatural form of organiza-
tion.2' This suggestion is in tension with the fact that all
individuals inevitably are the product of a communal union
between men and women.2' Regardless of whether one accepts
20. Locke refers to people's lives, liberties, and estates "by the general Name
Property." JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 395 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Mentor Books 1963) (3d ed. 1698).
21. See HOBBES, supra note 19, at 190.
22. Id. at 227.
23. In the state of nature, an individual's enjoyment of his property, that is, his
natural rights, was "very unsafe, very unsecure," and this uncertainty provided the
impetus for forming a social contract. LOCKE, supra note 20, at 395.
24. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 65 (E. V. Reiu ed. &
Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1743).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 60.
27. See generally Herbert W. Schneider, Moral Obligation, 50 ETHICS 45, 47
(1939-40) (describing the concept of a state of nature giving way to a state of contract
as a myth which was created to demonstrate the origin of duties and rights).
28. Aristotle theorizes that the polis, that is, society, or literally, the "city," exists
by nature and preceded the existence of the individual. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 6
(Ernest Barker ed., Clarendon Press 1982). Ernest Barker, commenting on Aristotle,
says that
[t]he polis exists by nature in the sense that it is the whole to which man
naturally moves in order to develop his innate capacity, and in which he is thus
included as a part. Because it is the whole, of which the individual is
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the premise that people are by nature communal, it takes a
leap of faith to assume that people are inherently individualis-
tic, or that rights are by nature individual. Liberal democratic
thought nevertheless makes exactly this assumption. One
could just as easily assume that all rights are by nature
communal and that individual rights are but an afterthought,
a gesture of benevolence or utility by the commonwealth
toward its members.
Second, because liberal democracy assumes that people are
inherently individualistic, it creates a tension between people's
"naturally" selfish desires and the constraints of society.
Liberal democracy views people as inherently selfish and pits
them against their fellow citizens and against society.29 This
view has important consequences for humanity's self-image
and for citizens' behavior in a communal environment.
Third, liberal democracy permits individual existence to
determine essence and provide meaning. Liberal democrats
believe that each person is a sovereign3" and that people are
born "with a Title to perfect Freedom." 1 This presumption is
but one step from Sartre's existentialist assertion that "man
is freedom."32 The tremendous scope of individual freedom
provided by liberal democracy requires a recognition of the
primacy of the individual because, in liberal democracy, virtue
resides in the individual.33 By its nature, liberal democracy
necessarily a part, it is prior to the individuals who are its parts, as wholes
generally are prior to their parts.
Id. at 6 n.2.
29. Freud also viewed humans as inherently selfish:
[T]heir neighbour is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but
also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit
his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his
consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture
and to kill him. Homo homini lupus [man is a wolf to man].
FREUD, supra note 4, at 68-69.
30. Locke stated that naturally every man is a king, yet an equal with others.
"For all being Kings as much as he, every Man [is] his Equal." LOCKE, supra note 20,
at 395.
31. Id. at 366.
32. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM 27 (Bernard Frechtman trans.,
Philosophical Library 1947) (1945).
33. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1981), which
states:
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suggests that values stem from the individual and therefore
are relative.34
America's own embracement of liberal democratic thought
has contributed to an inability to differentiate between good
and bad; cultural relativism destroys both one's own good and
the good of others.35 Granted, one who espouses tolerance
could be a moral absolutist personally. But in practice, ex-
cessive tolerance tends to create a citizenry devoid of
prejudices.3" Allan Bloom writes that "[t]here is one thing a
professor can be absolutely certain of: almost every student
entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth
is relative .... They are unified only in their relativism and
in their allegiance to equality."37 Bloom's observation is
applicable beyond the classroom. When complete tolerance
prevails, the result is greater decentralization of authority,
because tolerance teaches not that there are core values to
which all should ascribe, but rather that individual
preferences must guide each action.
The immoderateness of liberalism gives one pause. When
each person is a god, whose law is to prevail? When each
person is a god, is there any need for leadership, guidance or
service by a legal elite that is cognizant of society's collective
The continued existence of a free and democratic society depends upon
recognition of the concept that justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in
respect for the dignity of the individual and his capacity through reason for
enlightened self-government. Law so grounded makes justice possible, for only
through such law does the dignity of the individual attain respect and protec-
tion. Without it, individual rights become subject to unrestrained power, respect
for law is destroyed, and rational self-government is impossible.
34. Moral relativism pervades the legal profession. Thomas Shaffer has
bemoaned the fact that "[e]xcept as provided in the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, there is no more accounting for morals than there is for one's taste in beer."
Thomas L. Shaffer, Moral Moments in Law School, 4 SOc. RESP.: JOURNALISM, L.,
MED. 32, 38 (1978).
35. See ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 36-38 (1987). The
opposite of prejudice is an existence devoid of values, a life lacking an ethos. Bloom
writes that "[h]istory and the study of cultures do not teach or prove that values or
cultures are relative .... To say that it does so prove is as absurd as to say that the
diversity of points of view expressed in a college bull session proves there is no
truth." Id. at 39. True openness is suppressed when one denies that it is possible
to know good and bad. Id. at 40. Cf FULLER, supra note 3, at 10 (asserting that the
ability to judge bad behavior requires that we embrace an ideal of what is good
behavior; society cannot impose duties or permit people to act in a certain way unless
it has before it a picture of the ideal human existence).
36. See id. at 36.
37. Id. at 25.
SUMMER 19931
862 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:4
needs and communal nature? When each person is a god, who
then should be surprised by Nietzsche's proclamation that
"God is dead"?38 Perhaps Nietzsche merely was observing that
God had been replaced by gods on Earth, humanity.39
B. The Free Market and the Curse of Specialization
Liberal democracy and the free market frequently occur in
tandem.4" The two systems are complimentary because both
are tied largely to the satisfaction of individual preferences.
Whereas liberal democratic theory upholds the individual as the
center of virtue, capitalism panders to individual tastes, as
represented by purchasing power. Western-style capitalist
doctrine states that individual preferences drive the free
market: prices and quantity correspond to supply and demand,
38. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, The Gay Science, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 95
(Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., Penguin Books 1987) (1882).
39. Consider the following passages from Walt Whitman:
I celebrate myself,
And what I assume you shall assume;
For every atom belonging to me, as good belongs to you...
Have you thought there could be but a single Supreme?
There can be any number of Supremes-one does not
countervail another any more than one eye-sight countervails another, or one
life countervails another.
Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass, quoted in HENRY ALONZO MYERS, ARE MEN EQUAL?
AN INQUIRY INTO THE MEANING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 56-58 (1945) Ralph Waldo
Emerson wrote that "[fn all my lectures, I have taught one doctrine, namely, the
infinitude of the private man." MEYERS, supra at 38 (quoting an 1840 diary entry by
Emerson).
A belief in the boundlessness of people's individual capacity and their perfectibility
has appeared frequently in the United States. Late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century evangelical Protestantism is one such example of liberal
democracy's excesses. In his work on the history of American social reform move-
ments, Ronald Walters examined the doctrine of perfectionism, or the notion that
individuals could become sanctified while on Earth. See RONALD G. WALTERS,
AMERICAN REFORMERS: 1815-1860, at 28 (1978). The most dangerous implication
of that ideal was that sanctified people could do no wrong. Id.
40. Free market economies typically accompany liberal democratic political
systems. See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS & MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 116 (1977). The converse is not necessarily true. See, e.g., James
Fallows, How the World Works, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1993, at 61, 76 (discus-
sing the free-market economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan,
none of which are liberal democracies in the Western sense).
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and demand is the expression of each purchaser's desires.41
Capitalism, with its rejection of an active government role in
the economy, promotes an individualist mentality in two ways.
First, laissez-faire capitalism relies on specialization, a
method of production that emphasizes individual processes
and tends to isolate the individual from the toil and concerns
of others. Second, laissez-faire capitalism tends to encourage
consumption without regard for the effect of that consumption
on society as a whole.
The engines of capitalism, specialization and market
systems, atomize society through their broad reliance on
specialists. Adam Smith's now legendary pin makers
demonstrate how specialization generally increases produc-
tivity. In The Wealth of Nations,42 Smith describes how nail
makers who perform all of the tasks associated with making
a nail are only a fraction as productive as an equal number of
nail makers who divide nail making into distinct operations
and specialize in a particular aspect of production, combining
their efforts to form a final product.43  Specialization
41. Americans' acceptance of laissez-faire principles is so axiomatic that criticism
of its "truths" borders on heresy. James Fallows suggests that
[i]f you don't believe in the laws of physics-actions create reactions, the
universe tends toward entropy-you are by definition irrational. And so with
economics. If you don't accept the views derived from Adam Smith-that free
competition is ultimately best for all participants, that protection and inter-
ference are inherently wrong-then you are a flat-earther.
Fallows, supra note 40, at 62. The United States embraced laissez-faire principles
only recently. See id. at 79. For 150 years after the Revolutionary War, the country
embraced protectionism in its industrial policy; the federal government frequently
provided the capital needed for major industrial initiatives. Id. at 82-84. "The great
industrial successes of the past two centuries-America after its Revolution, Germany
under Bismark, Japan after the Second World War-all violated the rules of laissez-
faire." Id. at 84 (quoting Professor Thomas McCraw of the Harvard Business School).
As with nineteenth-century Britain, the relatively recent espousal of "out-and-out
mercantilist policy" by the United States occurred only when it believed it could
withstand open competition from foreigners. Id. at 79-84 (quoting Professor
McCraw).
42. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Clarendon
Press 1976) (1795).
43. Smith related that
[a] smith who has been accustomed to make nails . .. can seldom with his
utmost diligence make more than eight hundred or a thousand nails a day. I
have seen several boys under twenty years of age who had never exercised any
other trade but that of making nails, and who, when they exerted themselves,
could make, each of them, upwards of two thousand three hundred nails in a
day.
Id. at 18.
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undoubtedly increases productivity and, more importantly,
profitability. Moreover, specialization is likely to increase
accountability of employees to employers because a given task
is easily associated with the particular employee who
performed it. Specialization's curse, however, is that it
frequently removes the individual from the whole and renders
her unable to understand the relation of the steps in the
process. Even Adam Smith noted that narrow-mindedness is
one side effect of specialization: "[blut in consequence of the
division of labour, the whole of every man's attention comes
naturally to be directed towards some one very simple
object."44
Karl Marx recognized that specialization overlooks or rejects
communal interests. "[Tihe division of labour implies the
contradiction between the interest of the separate individual
or the individual family and the communal interest of all
individuals who have intercourse with one another."45 For
example, the division of labor can make it difficult to identify
the moral aspects of a problem.4" A partner in a large New
York law firm offers this insight:
Big law firms with narrow specializations ... offer less
opportunity for individual counseling of clients. When you
have a real client, you continually interact, whereas in a
big firm you're just one of 30 associates working on a
problem. And if jobs get separated into enough pieces...
the moral dimensions tend to disappear.47
The lack of breadth that accompanies specialization creates
a strange person, one who regards himself as one "who
44. Id. at 20. The phenomenon of specialization may provide an excuse to evade
the responsibility which usually accompanies privilege. Once, in a legal ethics class,
I heard a future securities lawyer explain that he felt that he would owe no special
duty of public service as an attorney. He reasoned that it would be impossible for
him to perform pro bono work because a specialist in securities law could rarely be
of help to the poor.
45. Karl Marx, The German Ideology: Part I, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 160
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978).
46. President Wilson once grieved that "[the] truth is, we are all caught in a
great economic system which is heartless." RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL TRADITION & THE MEN WHO MADE IT 234 (1973).
47. Robert Kanigel, Uncertain of Our Gods, NOTRE DAME MAG., Summer 1988,
at 34, 44. The law is so specialized that "[tihere is no such thing as a corporate
lawyer." Id. For a humorous collection of essays taking large firms to task, see
generally MORDECAI ROSENFELD, THE LAMENT OF THE SINGLE PRACTITIONER (1988).
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knows," but who actually knows only his "tiny corner of the
universe."4" He is "radically ignorant of all the rest."49 If the
average citizen's experience is so narrow, democratic govern-
ment may not function properly because meaningful participa-
tion in representative government requires the ability to look
beyond immediate self-interest. Good citizenship and
leadership demand an understanding of what course of action
is best, which in turn requires the ability to compare theories,
systems, and ways of doing things. Good citizens and leaders
have the ability to combine "the powers of the most distant
and dissimilar objects" when searching for solutions to
problems.5 ° Specialization hinders this ability.
The eradication of western-style capitalism would be neither
propitious nor possible.5' Capitalism nevertheless is limited
as a system of social organization and control52 because it pays
insufficient heed to society's need to make qualitative, collec-
tive choices. 53 Western market-economists tend to believe that
each person acting on her own behalf will produce the "best"
results for all. The concept of the "tragedy of the commons"
reveals the limits of this belief. Consider a communally-owned
resource, such as land, which may be used and exploited by all
citizens of the community. The citizen who uses the land, for
example to hunt, till, or mine, will have an incentive to grossly
48. JOSe9 ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 111 (W.W. Norton &
Co., College ed. 1957) (1930).
49. Id. The specialist is a novelty:
[Pireviously, men could be divided simply into the learned and the ignorant,
those more or less the one, and those more or less the other. But your specialist
cannot be brought in under either of these two categories. He is not learned,
for he is formally ignorant of all that does not enter into his specialty; but
neither is he ignorant, because he is "a scientist," and "knows" very well his
own tiny portion of the universe. We shall have to say that he is a learned
ignoramus, which is a very serious matter, as it implies that he is a person who
is ignorant, not in the fashion of the ignorant man, but with all the petulance
of one who is learned in his own special line.
Id. at 112.
50. SMITH, supra note 42, at 21.
51. As long as specialization is profitable, the tendency toward it will continue.
Unlike Marx, however, I believe that specialization's fruits justify the preservation
of much of the western-style capitalist system.
52. Professor Lindblom compares the market to a tool, "designed to do certain
jobs but unsuited for others." LINDBLOM, supra note 40, at 76.
53. "Before the principle of marginal utility nothing is sacred; all existing
arrangements are subject to being reordered in the interest of increased economic
return.' FULLER, supra note 3, at 28.
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overuse it because although she alone reaps the benefits, the
costs of her overuse are distributed throughout the com-
munity. The tragedy is that when each citizen acts in her own
best interests, for example by maximizing the present value of
her property rights, the long-term value of the communal
resource will diminish.54
A similar result occurs in the market economy any time a
person or entity fails to internalize externalities 5 when ex-
ercising private property rights. This problem underlies any
market transaction in. which total costs, including costs to
third parties or society, are not reflected in price. Market
imperfections, including uninternalized externalities, are why
the person who steadfastly pursues his own good usually is
not producing simultaneously what is best for society.56
The fruit of western economics is more fruit-increased
quantity. 7  The productive advantages of capitalism are
admittedly self-evident. 8 Nonetheless, a system that produces
"more" can have its drawbacks. For society's well-being, free
market systems need a counter-balancing force which
emphasizes the relationship between the producer, consumer
54. This example is borrowed from Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (Papers & Proceedings 1967).
55. "Externalities" are those costs and benefits which result from a person's act
but which are borne or reaped by a third party. A person who acts but considers only
the costs and benefits to himself is not "internalizing," or including in his cost-benefit
calculation, the external effects of his actions on others. See JESSE DUKEMINIER &
JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 38-43 (2d ed., 1988).
56. Professors Rhode and Luban assert that market imperfections justify
external oversight of the Bar. DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS
646-47 (1992). These imperfections include: (1) information barriers (the clients'
inability to accurately assess the services they receive because of their lack of past
experience); (2) adverse selection (because of information barriers, clients cannot
choose accurately the most capable lawyers, which creates a lack of incentive for
lawyers to provide quality services); (3) free riders (individual lawyers who benefit
from the Bar's general reputation without adhering to or maintaining that standard);
and (4) externalities (discussed supra, note 55). See id.
57. The free-market economic approach assumes that the ultimate measure of
a society is its level of consumption. Fallows, supra note 40, at 66; see also SMITH,
supra note 42, at 21 (observing that the "subdivision of employment" means that
'more work is done upon the whole, and the quantity of science is considerably
increased by it").
58. The inefficiencies of most communist economies render them inferior, in
terms of output and consumption, to most capitalist economies. See, e.g., THE SOVIET
ECONOMY: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (Morris Bornstein ed., 1981) (offering insightful
examinations and critiques of the Soviet economic system before the Soviet Union's
dissolution). Nevertheless, western-style capitalism is but one of many successful
economic systems in existence. See, e.g., Fallows, supra note 40, at 76 (discussing the
successes of Asian economies).
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and society. This is doubly true when, as in the United
States, a free market economy is paired with a liberal
democracy, a political system that merely reinforces the
primacy of the individualist perspective.
C. Science and the Myth of Progress
Inscience, the authority embodied in the opinion of
thousands is not worth a spark of reason in one man.
-Galileo 59
Aristocratic nations are naturally too apt to narrow
the scope of human perfectibility; democratic
nations, to expand it beyond reason.
- Alexis de Tocqueville °
Liberal democratic thought and modern science are united
in their glorification of the individual. Whereas liberal
democracy upholds the individual as a vessel of rights, science
views the individual as the seat of knowledge. In January
1610,"1 Galileo turned his telescope to the heavens and shat-
tered millennia-old beliefs about the Moon, the planets, the
stars, and, more importantly, humanity's ability to know its
place in the universe. 2 First, Galileo's discoveries seemed to
59. PIETRO REDONDI, GALILEO: HERETIC 37 (1987) (quoting Galileo Galilei).
60. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 11, at 158.
61. Experts offer conflicting dates. Daniel Boorstin gives the date as January
1610. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE DISCOVERERS 318 (1983). Brian Appleyard simply
offers the year 1609. BRYAN APPLEYARD, UNDERSTANDING THE PRESENT: SCIENCE
AND THE SOUL OF MODERN MAN 17 (1992). More significantly, however, Appleyard
chooses this moment as the birth of modern science. Id. at 17-18.
62. Galileo wrote:
What was observed by us in the third place is the nature or matter of the Milky
Way itself, which, with the aid of the spyglass, may be observed so well that all
the disputes that for so many generations have vexed philosophers are
destroyed by visible certainty, and we are liberated from wordy arguments. For
the Galaxy is nothing else than a congeries of innumerable stars distributed in
clusters.
GALILEO GALILEI, THE SIDEREAL MESSENGER 62 (Albert V. Helden trans., University
of Chicago Press 1989) (1610).
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demonstrate that there is a scientific solution for every
problem.63 Humanity therefore must hold the key to all of
life's secrets; the potential for knowledge is boundless.
Second, Galileo's discoveries threatened and ultimately
destroyed the monopoly on knowledge and truth claimed by
the Roman Catholic Church. 4 The Church, realizing the
revolutionary significance of Galileo's discoveries, condemned
him for heresy, but condemnation was futile. Over time,
science retained its appeal because, in a practical sense, "it
worked!"65
The influence of the early modern European scientists on
the development of the western mind should not be under-
estimated. Science challenged established concepts of order,
and in doing so fundamentally altered common beliefs about
epistemology, the individual's ability to discover truth, and
hence, humanity's place in the world.66 David Bohm argues
that "our notions of order are pervasive, for not only do they
involve our thinking but also our senses, our feelings, our
intuitions, our physical movement, our relationships with
other people and with society as a whole and, indeed, every
phase of our lives."67 Scientific discoveries challenged previous
63. See APPLEYARD, supra note 61, at 4-6 ("nothing can be ultimately unknown").
Appleyard explains that "from 1700 onwards the human imagination was convinced
that nature could be fully understood as a series of differential equations, as an
algorithmic compression." Id. at 46.
64. Appleyard's view is that science played an important role in the growing
dissident movement of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a movement which
embodied the spirit of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation,
and the discovery of the New World. Id. at 28-37. Allan Bloom argues that Galileo
and his fellow scientists were the natural enemies of the established powers because
scientific investigations undermined those powers' divine legitimacy. BLOOM, supra
note 35, at 296. This spirit eventually toppled the old order. "Science became
enthroned as the final arbiter of truth and value, occupying a position similar to that
of the church in the Middle Ages." John H. Hallowell, The Decline of Liberalism, 52
ETHICS 323, 337 (1941-42).
65. See generally APPLEYARD, supra note 61, at 3-6 (asserting that science's
greatest appeal and promise is that "it works" in a very practical sense).
66. The work of the early modern scientists marked a shift from metaphysics or
ontology to epistemology. See, e.g., APPLEYARD, supra note 61, at 58 (discussing
science and its epistemological supremacy). Whereas the ancient Greek might
exclaim, "God exists!," the Renaissance man would ask, "How do you know?"
67. DAVID BOHM, WHOLENESS AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER 176 (1980). Scholars
have argued that scientific discoveries can have implications far beyond their direct
application and can alter beliefs previously held as immutable. "When Copernicus
ousted Earth and its travelers from their illusion of a central place in the universe,
his assertion went beyond physics: it called into question our privileged relationship
to God." SHERRY TURKLE, THE SECOND SELF: COMPUTERS AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT
308 (1984).
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concepts of order and thereby diminished the authority of
nonsecular institutions.8 The authority of the individual
filled the void.
In this sense, Descartes foreshadowed the liberal democratic
movement:
I thus concluded that the foundation of our opinions is far
more custom and example than any certain knowledge.
And finally, although this is the foundation of our
opinions, I noticed that the approval by the majority is no
guarantee of that truth that is difficult to discover, and in
such cases it is much more likely that truth will be found
by one person than by many. I could, however, select from
the crowd no one whose opinions seemed worthy of
preference and thus I found myself compelled to use my
own reason in the conduct of my life.69
Descartes's conclusion is based on a premise provided by
science-that each person can discover the truth. This con-
clusion is reminiscent of Martin Luther's attack on the
"spiritual estate" of Rome and his proclamation that "we are
all priests alike,"7 ° each equally capable of interpreting or
espousing "The Word."7" The definition of The Word, however,
becomes uncertain when individuals, each acknowledged to
have the ability to determine truth, debate its meaning and
arrive at conflicting conclusions. Each individual becomes
more inclined to believe that The Word is his or her word.72
68. See APPLEYARD, supra note 61, at 55-60.
69. RENt DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD 14 (John Veitch trans., J.M. Dent
& Sons 1949) (1637).
70. Martin Luther, Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation, in
2 CLASSICS OF WESTERN THOUGHT: MIDDLE AGES, RENAISSANCE, & REFORMATION
522 (Karl F. Thompson ed., 1988); see also C. Dyke, Collective Decision Making in
Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, & Mill, 80 ETHICS 21 (1969). Dyke states that the major
issue of the Reformation was "[w]hat is the relationship of an individual to his God;
and in particular, what is the relationship of an individual to God's Law?" Id. The
Reformation's answer is that "each man is an autonomous individual who needs no
intermediary in his approach to God." Id.
71. Martin Luther, The German Reformation, in THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION
71 (Hans J. Hillerbrand ed., 1968) (stating that "no ruler ought to prevent anyone
from teaching or believing what he pleases, whether gospel or lies").
72. Sigmund Freud has called humanity a "prosthetic God," one who imitates
God in action and attitude, and yet is not in reality a deity. FREUD, supra note 4, at
44. Freud also notes, however, that "present day man does not feel happy in his
Godlike character." Id. at 45.
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In this way, science suggests that truth, and therefore values,
are relative.73
Not only has science promoted the individual as a source of
societal authority, but it has attempted to show that humanity
is evolving toward a superior form of existence. Darwin's
evolutionary theory purports to explain the chain of progress,
in which the weak succumb to the strong and the dumb to the
clever. 4 In this context, time assumes a moral character. The
past is bad, the present is better, and the future will be better
still.75 The verity of this proposition is exemplified by posing
the question: "At what period of history would you like to
have lived?"7 6 The answer is obvious-we prefer to live today,
because it is "better" than the past.77
The myth of science as progress is attributable perhaps to
the ease of living that science has provided.78 Modernity's
zeitgeist is satisfaction of one's appetites. The American
dream manifests the very essence of this spirit. Each suc-
ceeding generation is to have more opportunities, achieve
greater success, enjoy greater comforts, and secure greater
liberties than did preceding generations.79 Sadly, because
73. This proposition's influence is nowhere more apparent than in universities,
which, to varying degrees, have embraced the "mythical need for a sterilized, 'value
neutral' education." Richard A. Salomon, "Shades of Gray" and Other Myths, 1
GEORGETOWN J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 463, 465 (1987).
74. See generally CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Random House
1936) (1892); CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN (Random House 1936) (1898).
75. See APPLEYARD, supra note 61, at 222; see also MYERS, supra note 39, at
110-14 (1955) (attacking the conclusion of Darwin's admirers that because later life
forms are more advanced than earlier ones, living beings will reach their goal of
perfection).
76. ORTEGA Y GASSET, supra note 48, at 35.
77. Id. at 34-35.
78. Technology removes hurdles and seems to be a panacea for many problems.
For example, modern engineering has made considerable steps toward eliminating
flooding, a phenomenon once so catastrophic that the ancient Egyptian calendar was
based upon the weeping rhythm of nature. BOORSTIN, supra note 61, at 6-7.
Boorstin states that "[tihe rhythm of the Nile was the rhythm of Egyptian life." The
rise and fall of the Nile was such a regular and important force in ancient Egyptian
life that it marked the phases of the "Nile year," a calendar used by Egyptians as
early as 4241 B.C. Id. at 7. The Aswan Dam now controls the flow of the Nile into
lower Egypt and nearly has eliminated the threat of flooding downriver. Id.
79. Alluding in his first State of the Union address to the need to revive the
American dream, President Bill Clinton stated: "Once, Americans looked forward to
doubling their living standards every 25 years. At present productivity rates it will
take a hundred years to double living standards, until our grandchildren's
grandchildren are born. I say that is too long to wait." Text of the President's
Address to a Joint Session of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1993 (Late ed.) at A20,
A21.
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science seems capable of continually overthrowing the old
order and reinventing "truth," our belief in scientific progress
creates the illusion that the past is dispensable.8 ° Ortega y
Gasset writes:
Hence for the first time [in history] we meet with a period
which makes tabula rasa of all classicism, which recog-
nises in nothing that is past any possible model or stan-
dard, and appearing as it does after so many centuries
without any break in evolution, yet gives the impression of
a commencement, a dawn, an initiation, an infancy. We
look backwards and the famous Renaissance reveals itself
as a period of narrow provincialism, of futile gestures-
why not say the word?-ordinary?8 '
The disassociation of the past and present, which science
encourages, intimates that old standards of what is good are
useless today. 2
This is an unfortunate deception because history may provide
fodder for the resolution of modern moral problems. In con-
trast, science is incapable of solving the moral dilemmas that
have puzzled man throughout time. In our great "progress,"
Einstein, Plank, Hawking, Galbraith, and Jung have not
resolved the issues posed by Plato, Mill, and Nietzsche: "what
is justice?,"8 3 "what is the proper sphere of state action?," 4 or
"what is the criterion for goodness?"85 While science solves
many problems, it creates just as many: science is no
catholicon. Its freedom is hollow.86 George Will writes:
80. One such critic has alleged that "the truths of science do not require the
wisdom of the past." APPLEYARD, supra note 61, at 237. Appleyard contends that
"the past comes to be understood as an undeveloped realm, an impoverished Africa
of memory and imagination, useful only as a staging post for the future." Id. at 236.
81. ORTEGA Y GASSET, supra note 48, at 36.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett Publishing Co.
1974).
84. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton &
Co. 1975) (1859).
85. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, The Genealogy of Morals, in THE BIRTH OF
TRAGEDY AND THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 158-88 (Francis Golffing trans., Doubleday
Anchor Books 1956) (1887).
86. Freud also felt that technology was no panacea for an unfulfilled life:
Men are proud of [their] achievements, and have a right to be. But they seem
to have observed that this newly-won power over space and time, this subjuga-
tion of the forces of nature . . . has not increased the amount of pleasurable
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Freedom is not only the absence of external restraints. It
also is the absence of irresistible internal compulsions,
unmanageable passions and uncensorable appetites. From
the need to resist, manage and censor the passions there
flows the need to do so in the interest of some ends rather
than others. Hence freedom requires reflective choice
about the ends of life.
87
Reflective choice loses much of its meaning if the choice ex-
cludes previous standards of what is good. Notions of progress
should not persuade us that the answers to our problems lie
only in the present.88
D. The Emptiness of the Individual
As liberal democracy weakened the institutions of the past,
and free market and science stressed the essence of individual
existence, people increasingly looked within themselves to fill
the spiritual void. Today such self-reflection often involves
psychoanalysis. Unlike political philosophy, which deals with
the relationship between people as a group, traditional
psychology is concerned predominantly with a dissection of the
individual psyche. 89  Freud, in Civilization and Its
satisfaction which they may expect from life and has not made them feel
happier.
FREUD, supra note 4, at 39.
87. WILL, supra note 6, at 66.
88. Ortega y Gasset tells a story about the waning of time-tested ideals:
The gypsy in the story went to confession, but the cautious priest asked him if
he knew the commandments of the law of God. To which the gypsy replied:
"Well, Father, it's this way: I was going to learn them, but I heard talk that
they were going to do away with them."
ORTEGA Y GASSET, supra note 48, at 134.
89. Psychology is "concerned with the individual mind and its processes," and
therefore it is doubtful "if a psychological approach can suffice to explain intercon-
nections between .. . individuals." Kurt Wilk, Law and the State as Pure Ideas:
Critical Notes on the Basic Concepts of Kelsen's Legal Philosophy, 51 ETHICS 158, 179
(1940-41). Wilk argues that the psychological approach to political thought reduces
the state to a bundle of psychological relationships between individuals. Id. at 180.
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Discontents90 and The Ego & the Id, 9' performed a taxonomy
of the Self. Like a twentieth-century Darwin, Freud at-
tempted to understand the mysteries of organized society by
dissecting the mind. His conclusion was that "the purpose of
life is simply the programme of the pleasure principle." 92
An analysis that begins by exalting each individual's needs
has difficulty transcending itself; such an analysis runs the
risk of portraying humanity as a spoiled child who has dif-
ficulty with life's spiritual or moral aspects. If the measure-
ment of progress is morality, then the nihilism of modern
value relativity suggests that society is in danger of devolving
into a collectivity of individuals.
93
II. SELFISH INDIVIDUALISM AS THE ANTITHESIS OF MORALITY
This Note has argued that the individualism inherent in
liberal democracy, although itself hardly antithetical to vir-
tuous civilization,94 carries seeds of atomism which threaten
society's disintegration. Fortunately, liberal democracy is a
broad and flexible concept. It is capable of embracing various
roles for government and the individual. At its outer edges,
liberal democracy is threatened by totalitarianism and
nihilism. Totalitarianism, the tyranny of the majority, im-
poses absolute governmental control upon the citizenry;95
90. FREUD, supra note 4.
91. SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO & THE ID (J. Strachey ed., W.W. Norton & Co.
1962) (1923).
92. FREUD, supra note 4, at 25.
93. How odd then that a state of nature which never existed before civilization
could threaten to exist now within it!
94. Liberal democracy is unique in its rejection of force and birthright as a
source of authority. Liberal democracy may be viewed as somewhat moral because
it eschews conflict by attempting to govern by some measure of consensus. One
author and critic of liberal democratic thought has conceded that "[l]iberalism ... is
the supreme form of generosity; it is the right which the majority concedes to
minorities and hence it is the noblest cry that has ever resounded in this planet. It
announces the determination to share existence with the enemy; more than that,
with an enemy which is weak." ORTEGA Y GASSET, supra note 48, at 76.
95. An ominous warning of the evils which are possible when twentieth-century
science combines with unrelenting majoritarianism is Huxley's Brave New World.
ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAvE NEW WORLD (1932). The teachings of Mao Tse-tung provide
another example of majoritarianism gone awry. In typical totalitarian fashion, he
emphasizes the need for the individual to subject his will to the interests of the
Communist state:
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nihilism and gross individualism lead to the total rejection of
community institutions and values. Both extremes are to be
feared. The most immediate threat to the American society's
well-being comes from excessive individualism and its lack of
morality.
I will make an assertion that many Americans will find
untrue on its face: individualism is not moral.9 6  In-
dividualism's objective is the pursuit of individual as opposed
to group interests. Individualism's first principle is that no
social goal can justify forcing an individual to be a resource for
others;97 it assumes that freedom from external constraints is
morality. Such freedom is in reality the antithesis of
morality.9" One cannot properly "define the conditions of
freedom for single individuals prior to considering the condi-
tions of freedom for all individuals" because "one individual's
free act is a limit on the freedom of another and thus every
free act is potentially coercive in its effect on the freedom of
others."99 Accordingly, moral laws do not consider the in-
dividual as an individual. They instead focus on regulating
relations between people to strive for the general good.'00
Morality cannot be understood outside of the context of the
interaction between individuals in a society.'0 ' Individualism
ignores the idea that the law and the state aim not at the
At no time and in no circumstances should a Communist place his personal
interests first; he should subordinate them to the interests of the nation and of
the masses. Hence, selfishness, slacking, corruption, seeking the limelight, and
so on, are most contemptible, while selflessness, working with all one's energy,
whole-hearted devotion to public duty, and quiet hard work will command
respect.
4 CLASSICS OF WESTERN THOUGHT: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 49 (Donald S.
Gochberg ed., 1980) (quoting Mao Tse-tung).
96. "Immorality is doing harm to others; doing good to self is not necessarily
doing harm to others.... Up to a certain point a man may be an egoist without
hurting anyone." Frank Thilly, The Moral Law, 10 ETHICS 223, 228 (1989-90).
97. Jeffrey H. Reiman, The Fallacy of Libertarian Capitalism, 92 ETHICS 85, 85
(1981) (citing ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 33 (1974)).
98. Schneider, supra note 27, at 49.
99. Reiman, supra note 97, at 94.
100. Thilly, supra note 96, at 227.
101. Morality and surrounding issues of right and wrong emerge only when an
individual's will conflicts with an obligation to others, or when obligations to others
conflict. See Schneider, supra note 27, at 54. Such circumstances give rise to "a
conflict of duties and rights." Id. Thus, "moral principles cannot function in a social
vacuum or in a war of all against all.' Peter P. Nicholson, The Internal Morality of
Law: Fuller and His Critics, 84 ETHICS 307, 318 (1972-74) (quoting FULLER, supra
note 3, at 205-06). Moral principles quintessentially concern relations among people.
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individual good, but at the common good. Excessive in-
dividualism reduces civic-mindedness. 102  Edmund Burke
wrote that "Itihe effect of liberty to individuals is that they
may do what they please; we ought to see what it will please
them to do before we risk congratulations ....
III. THE DEMISE OF ELITISM
An examination of the Bar's role in a liberal democracy must
reconcile western egalitarian tendencies with the Bar's elite
role in controlling the instruments of individual and com-
munity rights. This Part argues that the forces of in-
dividualism, manifested by the rights revolution, became
powerful enough in the twentieth century to reshape many
elitist institutions in American society, including the Bar. The
rights revolution, however, failed to preserve the noble
qualities of those institutions, particularly the ability to make
an individual feel like part of a community. Despite the
reformed, more egalitarian nature of the Bar, this failure to
preserve the desirable qualities of imperfect institutions is one
reason why lawyers and public servants are held in low regard
by the public. Society therefore needs to recast its under-
standing of individual rights in order to find a place for
leadership and civic virtue.
A. The Western Individualist Tradition and the Demise of
Elitism in the Bar and Society
One cornerstone of western individualism is the belief in
individual rights and equality among citizens. This belief is
largely incompatible with traditional, elitist institutions. It is
perhaps inevitable that a society which regards individual
rights and equality among individuals as paramount values
will attack institutions which inhibit the full expression of
102. When citizens are no longer bound together by common concepts of virtue,
.social consensus becomes dangerously attenuated and citizenship becomes a blurry
notion." WILL, supra note 6, at 142.
103. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 9 (Thomas H.
D. Mahoney ed., 1955) (1790).
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personal rights. The transformation of the Bar and American
law in the twentieth century demonstrates that the glorifica-
tion of the individual and her rights have contributed to the
demise of elitism in American society.
Historically, the Bar reflected the character of American
elitist institutions in general. From the late 1800s 10 4 until the
middle of the 1900s, the Bar conspicuously exhibited the
classic negative features of a closed club. 105 Considerable
nonmerit barriers to entering the profession existed, admission
of members was tightly controlled, and economic competition,
including price competition, was regulated carefully.0 6 These
characteristics were an affront to liberal democratic notions of
equality.
Jerold Auerbach has argued that for the better part of the
last 150 years, privileged lawyers have manipulated the law
and instruments of justice for their own gain. 07 This elitist
Bar ignored the legal needs of the average citizen.10 8 The
racial, religious, ethnic, and gender stratification of the Bar
enabled a small group of lawyers, "self-appointed guardians of
professional interests," to legislate for the entire profession
and to speak for the Bar on matters of professional and public
consequence.' 0 9 This elite's H° principle objective was to struc-
ture legal education, ethics, discipline, and services so as to
meet its own political goals at a time when social change
threatened the status and the values of the groups to which
104. Bar associations first became a force in American law in the late 1800s. See
AUERBACH, supra note 15, at 62-63.
105. See Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism,"
41 EMORY L.J. 403, 410-16 (1992).
106. Id.
107. See AUERBACH, supra note 15, at 50-51 (noting that professional rules of
ethics "were applied by particular lawyers to enhance their own status and prestige").
108. Justice Blackmun lamented that "the middle 70% of our population is not
being reached or served adequately by the legal profession." Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350,376 (1977) (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REVISED HANDBOOK
ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 2 (1972)). One study of legal services in Chicago showed
that in metropolitan Chicago, about half the work of lawyers is devoted to represent-
ing corporate clients, and one quarter is devoted to representing small businesses.
Mark J. Osiel, Lawyers as Monopolists, Aristocrats and Entrepreneurs, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 2009, 2015 n.19 (1990) (reviewing LAWYERS IN SOCIETY (Richard L. Abel et al.
eds., 1988)).
109. AUERBACH, supra note 15, at 4. The Bar was born with elitist roots. The
American Bar's birth continued a tradition of elitism created by the English Bar. See
POUND, supra note 9, at 100.
110. I use the word "elite" to refer to racial, ethnic, gender, and socioeconomic
distinctions employed by the Bar. This Note, however, advocates a drastically
different vision of elitism in Part IV, infra.
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elite lawyers belonged."1  For decades, the nonelite were
denied access to the nation's finer law schools" 2 and denied
membership in its most influential law firms." 3  The ABA
established Canons which prohibited legal advertising, which,
in effect,
rewarded the lawyer whose law firm partners and social
contacts made advertising unnecessary at the same time
that it attributed inferior character and unethical behavior
to attorneys who could not afford to sit passively in their
offices awaiting clients; it thus penalized both them and
their potential clients, who might not know whether they
had a valid legal claim ..... 1"
Many state Bar associations also established preceptorship-
registration systems to weed out the "morally unfit" through
unevenly applied standards that "placed a premium upon
social standing, family connections"" 5 and certain personality
traits. These barriers ostensibly were erected to prevent
admission into the Bar of immigrants who, the legal elite
claimed, did not have "the faintest comprehension of the
nature of our institutions, or their history and development."" 6
111. AUERBACH, supra note 15, at 4. For example, James Beck, a former solicitor
general, wrote that "if the old American stock can be organized, we can still avert the
threatened decay of constitutionalism in this country." Id. at 125.
112. Id. at 29. For example, Harvard Law School's unique requirement in the
early 1900s that entering students possess a college degree eliminated 96% of eligible
candidates. Id.
113. Id. at 25. "Barriers to access became more formidable as the desirability of
access increased." Id.; see also RONALD CHESTER, UNEQUAL ACCESS: WOMEN
LAWYERS IN A CHANGING AMERICA 7 (1985) ("Traditionally, the profession has also
been extremely hierarchical in nature, granting women and minorities only very
limited access to its more prestigious and remunerative positions.").
114. AUERBACH, supra note 15, at 43. For an argument that access to legal
services will improve if attorneys are allowed to advertise, see Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
115. AUERBACH, supra note 15, at 123-27. A preceptorship system, which
required prospective law students to secure sponsors and to register those sponsors
with the Bar before admission to law school, was used because, as one Pennsylvania
Bar committee member explained, raising educational requirements in order to
exclude ethnic minorities was risky: it might "keep our own" out. Id. at 125.
116. Id. at 121 (quoting Att. Gen. George Wickersham). One Pennsylvania at-
torney observed in the early 1900s that even intellectually gifted and persevering
immigrants "come to the bar 'without the incalculable advantage of having been
brought up in the American family life,' and, therefore, they 'can hardly be taught the
ethics of the profession as adequately as we desire.'" Id. at 100 (footnote omitted).
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This rationale, however, was merely an excuse for excluding
from the practice of law those who might threaten the
hegemony of the elite. Auerbach concludes that "[t]he struc-
ture, the values, even the most cherished principles and basic
processes of professionalism were perceived as instruments of
injustice." 117
The Bar is less of a closed club than it used to be."' The
Bar currently is characterized by at least some measure of
racial, ethnic, gender, and religious diversity." 9 Educational
achievements are the only substantial barriers to entrance
imposed by most law schools. 2 ' Although control over admis-
sion to the Bar is held still by a small number of persons, they
must evaluate a huge pool of applicants, using relatively
objective criteria which make intentional discrimination more
difficult.12' Further, anticompetitive controls on fees and
advertising have been eliminated and competition has been
embraced.
122
Similarly, in the name of equality, Americans have
embraced a long legacy of legal reform. 123  Many of these
117. Id. at 306.
118. See, e.g., Valarie A. Fontaine, Cultivating a Diverse Work Force, NAT'L. L.J.,
Jan. 10, 1994, at 1 ('One of the many dramatic changes that has swept the legal
profession during the past 20 years is the growing number of women and minorities
entering the profession."). I do not suggest that the Bar has been cleansed of all
indicia of a closed club. The dearth of women and minority law firm partners is just
one manifestation of the Bar's continuing problems. See, e.g., id. at 1 (stating that
90% of all law firm partners are male and only 2.5% are minorities).
119. For example, "[bletween 1960 and 1980, the proportion of women law stu-
dents climbed from one in 25 to one in three." Kanigel, supra note 47, at 41.
120. Terrell & Wildman, supra note 105, at 411.
121. Id. at 412.
122. Id.
123. Although it is impossible to fully trace the history of legal reform, a few
obvious examples can be viewed as representative of the reform movement. E.g., U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV (abolishing tax restrictions on the right to vote and establishing
equal protection under the law); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (abolishing race restrictions
on the right to vote); National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) (erasing the
inequality of bargaining power between employees and management); Social Security
Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) (providing all working Americans with retirement benefits);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-e17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) (abolishing discrimination in the
workplace); Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1989b-b9 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) (making reparations
to Americans of Japanese descent interned during World War II); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (articulating a right of privacy as an individual right); Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation in public schools
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reforms attempted to reconcile the conflict between the con-
stitution's promise of equality and reality. To do so, the
reforms expanded the list of individual liberties. Com-
mentators have called the increase in rights-based claims a
rights "revolution."124 The animating force behind the rights
revolution has been a desire for equality. Because racial,
ethnic, and gender discrimination is incompatible with the
principle that all are equal before the law, institutions that
perpetrated such discrimination were dismantled. Similarly,
because lawyers preserved a discriminatory rule of law in-
compatible with the principle of equal justice, the Bar was
forced to change.
125
B. The Shortcomings of Revolution: Underemphasizing the
Importance of Social Institutions for Civic Life
The rights revolution properly discredited the excesses of
institutional elitism, but it has done so with temerity and
without discretion. Often an ideology "can discredit an entire
position containing many valid points of real social sig-
nificance which could stand without the accompanying ideol-
ogy."126  Consider what has occurred to eastern European
political and social structures over the last five years. One
German citizen noted:
[Tihere were good things in the former East Germany, and
it was not necessary to destroy everything.... For ex-
ample, there were excellent medical facilities in our
polyclinics and these have been dismembered. Unfor-
tunately, we did not follow the method of taking the good
in the East and the West and putting them together. 127
is unconstitutional).
124. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 4 (1991).
125. See AUERBACH, supra note 15, at 263-66.
126. Emilio Roma III, The Moral Sanctity of Legal Functions, 82 ETHICS 124, 124
(1971-72).
127. Roger Cohen, An Empty Feeling is Infecting Eastern Europe, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1993, at E3. A socialist from Berlin stated that "[p]eople in East Germany
cannot quite believe that for 40 years they did everything wrong. But the West
German approach has been [to] sweep it all away, and get it functioning. It's been
easier to destroy than to blend the old and the new." Id.
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Similarly, when faith in twentieth-century legal authority
disintegrated and revealed the role of lawyers in preserving
discrimination, "[tihe elaborate structure of ethics and values
which had defined professional responsibility for nearly a
century collapsed in a shambles." 28
The destruction of historic institutions is permissible only on
two conditions. First, old institutions must have nothing of
value to offer future generations. Second, the new structure
must have superior integrity and strength which is founded on
a higher virtue. Both conditions require an appreciation for
the beauty-and an understanding of the evil-of the past.
Eyes which perceive only the past's excesses are myopic. In
the process of scouring the Bar and society of elitist excesses,
reformers have overreached and robbed society of many vir-
tues.
The rights revolution correctly associated many American
social institutions with elitist excesses of the past. The rights
revolution, however, failed to join individual rights with civic
responsibility. One author asserts that "American rights talk
is set apart by the way that rights, in our standard formula-
tions, tend to be presented as absolute, individual, and in-
dependent of any necessary relation to responsibilities." 129 The
catalogue of individual liberties has expanded without regard
to their effect on the individual's perception of her relation to
others in society.13 0 The beauty of social institutions is that
their very existence reminds the citizenry that people are by
nature social beings.
Social institutions are critical for emphasizing the impor-
tance of people's relationships to each other and for planting
the seeds of civic duty in citizens. When social institutions are
discredited and not rebuilt, citizens lose an important means
through which to realize that others are like themselves.
More importantly, citizens lose the sense that they are part of
something larger than themselves, and therefore become less
compassionate and caring. Recognizing this, Tocqueville
wrote:
128. AUERBACH, supra note 15, at 263.
129. GLENDON, supra note 124, at 12.
130. See id. at 14.
SUMMER 1993] Role of Elitism in a Liberal Democracy 881
For in a community in which the ties of family, of caste, of
class, and craft fraternities no longer exist, people are far
too much disposed to think exclusively of their own inter-
ests, to become self-seekers practicing a narrow in-
dividualism and caring nothing for the public good. 13 1
Allegiance to social institutions is necessary to prevent society
from becoming a mere collection of individuals.
Two phenomena suggest that traditional social institutions
have been replaced not by superior structures, but by a con-
cern for the self. One phenomenon is disaffection with public
life. The other phenomenon is the current flood of litigation.
1. The Bar and Social Institutions are Held in Low
Esteem-Despite the Bar's attempts at reform, evidence sug-
gests that the Bar is held in low esteem by the public. Only
twenty-two percent of all respondents to a recent ABA survey
said that the phrase "honest and ethical" appropriately
described the legal profession, and a mere eight percent had
"great confidence" in law firms. 132  A 1993 survey by the
National Law Journal found that seventy-three percent of
Americans think that lawyers are "less honest than most
people," and only five percent said that they would encourage
their children to become lawyers. 33 Public opinion polls
consistently show that the public thinks about as highly of
lawyers as it does of funeral directors and used-car
salesmen.134 Lawyer jokes are yet another indicia of how the
sentiment against attorneys has spread to all segments of
American society. 13
5
Disrespect for the Bar is further evidenced by the growing
number of complaints about unethical attorney behavior.'36
131. Id. at 118 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION at xiii (Stuart Gilbert trans., Doubleday Anchor Books 1955)
(1856)).
132. Tim Poor, Lawyers Still Inspire Fear and Loathing: ABA Study Highlights
Image Problem, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 15, 1993, at 1C.
133. Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up, THE NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1.
134. Matthew Kauffman, Spirit of Lawyer Gags Have Some Attorneys Feeling
Glum, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 3, 1994, at Al.
135. For a discussion about the prevalence of and reasons for lawyer jokes, see
Robert L. Haig, Lawyer-Bashing: Have We Earned It?, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1993, at
2.
136. In recent years, many state bar associations have witnessed a great increase
in the number of complaints against attorneys. For example, in 1992, the Michigan
Attorney Grievance Commission received 3,980 requests for investigations of lawyers
and 289 formal complaints. Jennifer Van Doren, Lawyers' Credibility with Clients
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Lawyers readily admit that the profession has changed. One
Chicago attorney states that in the late 1940s and early 1950s
"there were very few lawyers whose word I wouldn't take.
Now there's a loss of respect from lawyer to lawyer, a loss of
collegiality."'37 The gentility, camaraderie, and mutual respect
that for years was the mark of the legal profession has given
way to sanctions against lawyers and legal malpractice
suits.
138
The nation's highest political leaders have urged the Bar to
reform itself.3 ' The leaders of private enterprise also have
clamored for legal reform; a columnist recently observed that
"lawyers 'are replacing labor unions as the chief scourge of
American business.' ,14o
The contrast between this current state of affairs and the
high esteem in which attorneys were held by the general
public at the end of the last century demonstrates the depths
to which the profession has sunk in the public's eyes. It was
precisely the nobility of law which drew so many immigrants
and first-generation Americans into the ranks of the Bar in
the early part of the twentieth century: "the nexus between
law and politics made a career as attorney personally attrac-
tive and politically important" to immigrants' sons."'
Diminishing, MICH. STATE U. NEWS, Feb. 23, 1993, at 5. Disciplinary orders against
Michigan attorneys have risen by 25% since 1990. Id. A Michigan Grievance
Commission administrator attributed the rise in complaints to a variety of causes,
including: (1) the greater number of attorneys practicing law; (2) increased publicity
for sanctions against lawyers; (3) increased incidences of unethical behavior; and (4)
closer self-regulation. Id. Other state bars have reported similar trends. See, e.g.,
Daniel Wise, Public Sanctions of Lawyers Increase 77% Over 3 Years in First
Department, N.Y. L.J., May 13, 1993, at 1 (The New York State Appellate Division's
First Department Disciplinary Committee reported that the rising disciplinary
caseload "stretched the committee's resources to the maximum.").
137. Kanigel, supra note 47, at 40.
138. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits judges to sanction
lawyers for a number of reasons, including: filing complaints for improper purposes,
filing complaints that are not well-grounded in fact, or filing complaints that are not
warranted by existing law. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. For commentary on the impact of
judicial sanctions against lawyers, see Joan M. Cheever, Is Rule 11 Being Misused?
Sanctioning Sanctions Against Attorneys, 120 N.J. L.J. 229 (1987); Paul D. Freeman,
The Rule 11 Ruckus: Sanctions Have Changed Federal Practice & Bitterly Divided
the Bar, 11 CAL. LAW., May 1991, at 17; Edward W. Remsburg & Steven K. Gaer,
General Overview of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 261
(1988-89).
139. For example, President Bush's Council on Competitiveness "deplored the
'baleful effects' of having too many lawyers." Galanter & Knight, supra note 8, at 13.
140. Id. (quoting Wall Street Journal columnist Paul A. Gigot).
141. AUERBACH, supra note 15, at 88.
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Given lawyers' stately task and the more democratic nature
of today's Bar, why have lawyers been the target of so much
scorn in recent decades? The surge in attacks on lawyers is
related to the fact that institutions devoted to public service
have come under attack. 4 2 A 1991 poll found that forty-six
percent of all Americans believed that many government
officials are corrupt, up from less than thirty percent in the
late 1950s.' 43 The same poll showed that fifty-nine percent of
those surveyed did not think that "public officials care much
what people like me think," twice the percentage of those who
held that view in the late 1950s.'44 It is no coincidence that
the reputation of the Bar should be tarnished at the same
time that the honor of public officials has come into increased
disrepute. Both law and politics define the relationship of
people to each other and to the community at large.
2. The Rights Revolution has Spurred a Flood of Litiga-
tion-Society's growing concern with the self is manifested in
the growing number of lawsuits. One commentator has at-
tributed the current flood of litigation to the erosion of the
concept of fault.'45 Citing strict liability and no-fault in-
surance as indicia of the erosion of the fault concept, Joseph
Spivey blasts attorneys, stating that "many strike suits
originate in the minds of lawyers who through various
strategies are able to solicit clients to their side." 4 ' According
to Spivey, such modern legal practices are inconsistent with
traditional notions of fault in which a victim was aware that
he would not invariably be compensated for his injury or
damage. Spivey ties the changing concept of "fault" to the
rise of the "insurance" concept, which holds that no one may
be injured without being made whole.'47
142. A Harris poll reveals that from 1966 to 1983, the
number of Americans saying that they have "a great deal of confidence" in
professional institutions declined precipitously: from 61 percent to 36 percent
in higher education, from 73 percent to 30 percent in medicine, from 41 percent
to 23 percent in organized religion, and from 62 percent to 35 percent in the
military.
Kanigel, supra note 47, at 45 (quotations and citations omitted).
143. AmITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 28 (1993)(citing Trust in Government, WASH. POST,
Nov. 3, 1991, at A17).
144. Id.
145. Joseph M. Spivey III, Society Deserves the Lawyers it Produces, 4 SOc. RESP.:
JOURNALISM, L., MED. 53, 55 (1978).
146. Id. at 56.
147. Id. at 55-57.
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Americans' obsession with individual rights and their
demands for compensation when they believe that those rights
have been compromised ignore the reality that individuals do
not live in a vacuum, but in a polity, or society, the largest of
social institutions. In a polity, rights are often in conflict.
Given limited resources, citizens often cannot exercise their
rights without trampling upon the rights of others. Because
rights often are incapable of being fully exercised, it is im-
proper to "fully" compensate an individual for the trampling
of those rights. As such, "[lights are neither natural nor
equal, they are not even equivalent or 'like.' They are recipro-
cal."148
C. The Ultimate Requisite for Social Health: Wedding
Rights with Responsibility
The hallmark of a civilization should be its morality.
America needs a vision of equality which can embrace the
best of the rights revolution-the scouring of discrimina-
tion-and the best of the institutions of the past-a devotion
to something larger than self. Rights must be wedded with
responsibility if society is to become a more inclusive and
healthier community.
148. Schneider, supra note 27, at 51. The ancient Greeks held a similar com-
munal view of rights. In ancient Greece, all freemen in Athens voted, but the
individual understood that he was part of a community. The Greeks therefore might
have spoken of the individual as part of a group: "Lycurgus of Sparta" or "Kleonike
of Athens." The Greeks were known by their place of citizenship and took great
pride in that identification.
Active involvement nourished a psychological state in the political animal,
breeding patriotism-fierce pride in and love for his polis. Every polis was then
a pressure chamber compelling men to discover and exercise their talents in the
interest of something larger, more enduring, and more splendid than
themselves. As such, the polis nourished an intensity of life seldom witnessed
in history and brought forth achievements which sometimes seems almost
superhuman.
JOHN B. HARRISON & RICHARD E. SULLIVAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN CIVILIZA-
TION 65 (1980). When the focus is on the community, the individual is much less
likely to demand restitution for each transgression.
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The state is in need of a force that will help reintroduce this
collectivist goal. By virtue of the role it plays in our political
and legal systems, the Bar is equipped to be one such force.
The proposition that all people are inherently equal animated
the anti-elitist sentiment largely responsible for cleansing the
Bar.149 Inherent equality of all people is not incompatible,
however, with the concept that law is a distinctive calling
which bestows a public duty upon those who practice it.
Liberal democracy requires a measure of leadership, which is
a form of elitism, in order to flourish.
IV. THE PROPER PLACE OF THE BAR: ELITISM REDEFINED
A. The Distinguishing Characteristic of Professionalism:
Service to the Community
Martin Luther King, Jr. stated that we should "never suc-
cumb to the temptation of believing that legislation and
judicial decrees play only minor roles .... The habits, if not
the hearts, of people have been and are being altered every
day by legislative acts, judicial decisions, and executive
orders."150
The work of lawyers is quintessentially public even when
conducted purely for monetary gain. Lawyers therefore have
a special responsibility for the morality of the nation and must
ensure that the creation and practice of law contribute to the
commonweal. In this sense, the law inescapably is an elite
calling and the Bar cannot spurn its unique obligation."'
149. See generally AUERBACH, supra note 15, at 160-90 (stating that much of the
sentiment to change the Bar also found a medium to effect a change on the profession
through the New Deal programs).
150. GLENDON, supra note 124, at 105 (quoting MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.,
STRENGTH TO LOVE 33-34 (1981)).
151. In the early nineteenth-century, the "feeling was strong that all callings
should be on the same footing, the footing of business, a money-making calling. To
dignify any one by styling it as a profession seemed undemocratic and un-American."
POUND, supra note 9, at 182. Professionalism, however, by definition separates one
group from another. Professionalism assumes inequality between groups, an
inequality which should manifest itself in the practice and in the ideals that the
profession pursues. The existence of equal rights, however, is not inconsistent with
meritocracy; in every democracy, society strives to punish criminals and reward its
most productive members.
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Elitism therefore should be redefined with regard to the Bar
in a way commensurate with the concept of noblesse oblige. 1
5 2
Attorneys' special duties spring from their special privilege
and power. No other profession is so involved in the control
and exercise of public power 53 and private rights. 5 4 Lawyers
control the levers of the Constitution and of our laws. As the
legal representatives of corporate America,' attorneys have
daunting power to influence the shape of society.'56 Moreover,
as the force that vindicates people's "rights,"15 7 lawyers are
entrusted with the most intimate facts about clients' personal
lives, financial history, and criminal conduct. 5 ' Finally,
lawyers have a distinctive occupation because individualist
152. The concept of noblesse oblige holds that noble birth imposes the obligation
of high-minded principles and noble actions. In a democracy, one may replace the
words "noble birth" with "pecuniary privilege" or "access to power." Josd Ortega y
Gasset claims that "[niobility is defined by the demands it makes on us-by obliga-
tions, not by rights. Noblisse oblige. 'To live as one likes is plebeian; the noble man
aspires to order and law.' (Goethe)." ORTEGA Y GASSET, supra note 48, at 63.
153. Auerbach asserts that the legal profession is a public profession because
lawyers monopolize access to the courts, which are public institutions. AUERBACH,
supra note 15, at 281.
154. See generally id. at 262-306 (describing the positive effect of lawyers in
furthering civil rights legislation in the South).
155. American lawyers are closely tied to US. commerce. A high percentage of
attorneys deal with the problems of corporations and wealthy individuals. RHODE &
LUBAN, supra note 56, at 167; see also Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Rethinking 'The
Practice of Law", 41 EMORY L.J. 451, 458 (1992) ("[S]tatistics suggest that a very
small percentage of clients absorb a very large proportion of legal services, and that
some segment of society ... is proportionately under-served by the legal profession.").
156. Mark Osiel argues that the Bar's power derives largely from its close
relationship to American commerce. OSIEL, supra note 108, at 2066. Lawyers are
powerful because they serve and are needed by corporate interests. Id.
Lawyers' role in the development of corporate law further demonstrates their
power to shape society. Charles E. Lindblom explains that mid-nineteenth-century
legal developments were instrumental in producing the modern corporation by
limiting stockholders' liability and conferring new authority upon organizers of large
enterprises. LINDBLOM, supra note 40, at 174. Lawyers also have played an
instrumental role in allowing corporations to perform functions that government
officials regard as indispensable to a healthy state. Id. at 175. As a result,
'[clorporate executives in all private enterprise systems, polyarchic or not, decide a
nation's industrial technology, the pattern of work organization, location of industry,
market structure, resource allocation, and, of course, executive compensation and
status." Id. at 171.
157. See Terrell & Wildman, supra note 105, at 415 (stating that much of the
debate about the law's proper social role is in terms of 'rights-talk").
158. The attorney-client privilege and the ethical duty of confidentiality exist
because clients entrust attorneys with information that affects their most valued
liberties. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the At-
torney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1978) (stating that the attorney-client
privilege is regarded by many as the 'pivotal" element allowing an attorney to
effectively represent a client).
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excesses have rendered law one of the last remaining vestiges
of community-shared values and expectations-in American
life. 159
In corporate law, fiduciaries owe the finest duty of loyalty,
"[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive."6 ° Lawyers are likewise the "fiduciaries" of the
people, guardians of their liberties and servants of the state.'1
6
Because lawyers exercise "quasi-governmental" powers,6 2 they
occupy a unique position which obligates them to raise the
level of civic consciousness.
6 3
Although definitions of "profession" have varied,6 4 the best
definitions include an element of public service.6 5  At the
159. As Terrell and Wildman put it:
All the other dimensions of our lives-race, religion, education, the arts,
regional loyalty, and so on-divide us as much as they join us together because
they are based on matters of "substance" on which we so often disagree. No
single social theme or set of themes could identify, for example, the "co-
mmunity" of New York City or Los Angeles or even Des Moines. The traditions,
heritage, and perspectives of Americans are now so disparate and isolated
within ever smaller subcommunities that no common purpose, direction or
moral values connect us fundamentally.
Except our system of law.
Terrell & Wildman, supra note 105, at 422.
160. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
161. Cf Roma, supra note 126, at 134. Roma argues that because public educa-
tion was not always a reality, and because the moral duty to educate has been
delegated by law, he, as a university professor, has a special duty to instruct students
to the best of his ability. Id. Similarly, because the privilege of being a lawyer is one
delegated by law, because each state licenses its attorneys to practice law, the right
to practice law carries a special responsibility.
162. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Legal & Ethical Position of the Code of
Professional Ethics, 4 Soc. RESP.: JOURNALISM, L., MED. 5, 7 (1979).
163. "[T]he public who grants a small segment of the populace the exclusive
privilege of making a living practicing law has the right to demand that those so
favored accept public service as one of their prime responsibilities." Chesterfield
Smith, Lawyers Who Take Must Put-At Least a Bit, 1 J. LEGAL PROF. 27, 30 (1976).
164. See, e.g., Byrne J. Horton, Ten Criteria of a Profession, 56 SCIENTIFIC
MONTHLY 164 (1944) (suggesting ten characteristics defining the professions of law,
medicine, theology, and advanced teaching); Kanigel, supra note 47, at 37 (suggesting
three characteristics that determine whether a worker is a "professional"). See
generally Douglas Klegon, The Sociology of Professions: An Emerging Prospective, 5
Soc. WORK & OCCUPATIONS 259, 260-62 (1978) (discussing "variations" among
definitions).
165. See POUND, supra note 9, at 9. The Bar is threatened with deprofessionaliza-
tion because of its actual or perceived indifference to its community service respon-
sibility. Jerold S. Auerbach, What Has Legal Education to do with Justice?, 3 Soc.
RESP.: JOURNALISM, L., MED. 36, 42 (1977); see also POUND, supra note 9, at 354
(asserting that inattention to service is a result of the "increasing bigness of things
in which individual responsibility" is diminished or lost, and "economic pressure upon
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heart of the concept of professionalism is the recognition that
service to others must accompany special position, privilege,
and knowledge. Power must not be divorced from moral
responsibility. Redefining elitism means equating privilege
with obligation.
Failure to fulfill the duty of public service means that
attorneys can fail morally in a way in which an ordinary
citizen cannot.166  The specter of such failure is especially
troublesome because so few societal forces now emphasize the
importance of community. Lawyers are in a unique position
to lead the fight against the excesses of individualism. To do
so, they must assume their duty of public service.
B. The Bar Must Provide a Greater Service to the
Community
I accordingly recommend two proposals for reform: (1) legal
education should take greater cognizance of interdisciplinary
studies and their moral lessons, and (2) each attorney should
be required to devote a percentage of her time to public
service.
1. Reforms to Legal Education-Law schools must produce
students who have the mental tools that will enable them to
assume the moral challenges which law presents. 167  Law
presents a moral challenge because law affects human interac-
tion and the way that people perceive their place in society.
Professors in every class should set aside time to discuss the
law's moral dimensions so that students will understand
better the implications of what they do as lawyers. Discussion
the lawyer may make the money-making aspect of the calling the primary or even the
sole interest").
166. See Roma, supra note 126, at 135. Roma uses the example of the policeman
to demonstrate how moral responsibility derives from special privilege:
The policeman can be held morally responsible for not using force to prevent
disorder in a way that I cannot. The fact that he can be held morally remiss
only serves to indicate that he does have a prima facie right to the use of such
force. The ordinary citizen under ordinary conditions is not morally obligated,
except with reference to his own behavior, to prevent disorder.
Id.
167. See Bryant G. Garth, Legal Education and Large Firms: Delivering Legality
or Solving Problems, 64 INDIANA L.J. 433, 444-45 (1989).
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of ethical issues simply should not be relegated to a required
class on legal ethics. Improperly pigeonholing ethical dis-
course suggests that ethics are only peripherally relevant to
substantive legal issues. The unfortunate reality, however, is
that law school classrooms seldom discuss values and
morality.18 One law student pointed out that "[iun the first
year of law school I had no class in which a solitary word was
ever said about right or wrong, should or ought, or the ethical
responsibility of lawyers."6 9 This is unfortunate because
studies demonstrate that professional schools do affect values
and students' moral judgments. 70 Students must understand
that their actions as lawyers affect not only themselves and
their clients, but society as well.
Law students also should be required to take courses from
other university departments, especially the humanities. 171 If
lawyers are to properly serve others by molding the law in a
meaningful way, they must have training, for example, in
world history and comparative and political philosophy. A
rudimentary understanding of the past is necessary if a lawyer
is to fathom the social repercussions of promulgating a law,
arguing a point, and representing a client. Such breadth also
is necessary for the lawyer to avoid becoming a specialist
unable to transcend his narrow world. 172  History and the
history of thought contain important messages about social
institutions and their founding values. The study of history
and cultures does not reveal that values or cultures are rela-
tive.173 To the contrary, such study demonstrates that there
are good and bad values. Lawyers must embrace worthy ideas
168. See, e.g., id. at 440 (suggesting that "[Il]aw professors have some difficulty
teaching core values" because brilliant teaching is irreverent of such values).
169. James R. Elkins, The Pedagogy of Ethics, 10 J. LEGAL PROF. 37, 49 (1985).
In one of my own law school classes on corporations, an inquisitive student asked an
ethical question about the proper scope of regulation during a discussion about
government regulation of business. The teacher replied that such issues were beyond
the scope of his class.
Some may reel at the thought of "teaching" morality. Professor W.I. Matson,
however, argues that "effective mind control is essential to a sound society." W. I.
Matson, Morality Pills, 77 ETHics 132, 132 (1962). Students must be allowed to
engage in reasoned debate about ethical ends. Id. Matson notes that Plato also
thought that virtue must be taught. Id. at 134-35.
170. Salomon, supra note 73, at 465.
171. See, e.g., id. at 467 (suggesting an interdisciplinary approach to the teaching
of law).
172. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 34.
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because lawyers' ideas frequently are transformed into laws
that profoundly affect human interaction.
2. Mandatory Public Service-Attorneys must be required
to devote a certain portion of time to the public interest.
174
Currently, lawyers find it easy to shun their public duties
because, as they see it, they have no public duties. Only one
of the fifty rules of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct discusses the basic responsibility of the lawyer to
provide legal services to those unable to pay.175 If lawyers are
not fulfilling their professional responsibilities, it is because
nothing is expected of them.176  Lip service to the ideal of
service is not sufficient. 177  Attorneys must be required to
perform public service.
7 8
The extent of service should vary according to each at-
torney's capacity. Less should be required of the attorney who
is barely able to support her family; by contrast, more should
be required of the attorney who is financially successful.
79
Additionally, an attorney should be able to discharge her
obligation through a broad array of activities which match the
attorney's interests and expertise when possible.8 ° Pro bono
work today consists primarily of assistance to the indigent and
174. See generally David Luban, Mandatory Pro Bono: A Workable (and Moral)
Plan, 64 MICH. BAR J. 280 (1985) (arguing that lawyers are morally obligated to
perform pro bono work, and proposing a plan to implement this obligation). But see
Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the
Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 78 (1990) (arguing that mandatory pro bono misses
the point, and that the Bar should instead focus its energies on providing legal
assistance to those unable to find it).
175. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1992).
176. But see Lisa G. Lerman, Symposium on Mandatory Pro Bono: Public Service
by Public Servants, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1141, 1142-43 (1991) (examining the nature
and scope of statutory barriers which hinder the ability of federal government
lawyers to provide pro bono representation to the poor when that representation
might conflict with government interests).
177. "It is, therefore not enough to set forth a code of ethics as a lamp for straying
feet." Edward A. Ross, The Making of the Professions, 27 ETHICS 67, 75 (1916-17).
Professsor Auerbach has argued that the Bar should lose its exemption from
government regulation if practitioners do not obligate themselves to provide public
service. Auerbach, supra note 165, at 42.
178. The proper form of regulation-government regulation, self-regulation, or
regulation by the market-goes beyond the scope of this Note. The actual form of
regulation is arguably of little consequence, as long as public service is actually
performed and attorneys and the public support the form.
179. But see Smith, supra note 163, at 31 (arguing that attorneys should be
required to tithe, that is, to devote at least one-tenth of their time to public service).
180. Id. at 28-29.
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others similarly situated."' 1 Such a conception of public
service is problematic. First, attorneys may refuse to engage
in pro bono work because they find such work too closely tied
to causes that they do not support.18 2 Second, such a defini-
tion of service is too narrow. An attorney should be allowed,
for example, to choose whether to aid the indigent, draft
proposals for a more efficient judicial system, assist law
schools in revising curricula, or perform government service."8 3
A trial attorney may wish to assist a local prosecutor's office
by assuming cases that the prosecutor otherwise would have
insufficient resources to pursue. 1 4 A corporate lawyer might
assist an organization to secure nonprofit status and draft its
articles of incorporation. A tax lawyer might help a
municipality revise its property tax regulations to better
reflect actual property value. The nature of the work actually
performed is perhaps less important than the motivation
behind that work. Lawyers must demonstrate their commit-
ment to the community.
Today's Bar, like today's society, reflects society's in-
dividualist bent. By virtue of the public nature of their work,
however, lawyers have an obligation to transcend self-interest
and to serve the community. The fulfillment of public duty
should begin with instruction demonstrating that the public
181. Course titles for pro bono training offered by the Washington, D.C. Bar
Public Services Corporation for 1993-94 include: Guardianship and Nursing Home
Issues, Public Benefits, Administrative Law Advocacy, Consumer Law Training,
Landlord and Tenant Training, Domestic Violence Training, AIDS Advocacy, Legal
Needs of the Homeless, Rights of D.C. Prisoners, Providing Pro Bono Representation
to Veterans in the U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals, and Family Law: Child Custody,
Social Security Disability.
182. Some mandatory pro bono programs adopted by law schools have been
criticized for forcing students to support political agendas that students do not
endorse. Christopher Sterbenz, Mandatory Pro Bono: Oxymoron and Outrage, N.J.
L.J., May 2, 1991, at 9 (noting that critics of law school public service requirements
argue that students subjected to such requirements often are permitted to work only
for carefully screened organizations with a very liberal or progressive agenda); see
also Terrell & Wildman, supra note 105, at 420-22 (criticizing the approach to public
service that equates professionalism to assisting the poor as the politicalization of
professionalism).
183. See generally Smith, supra note 163, at 28-29 (stating that underrepresenta-
tion is evident in fields such as the environment, consumer protection, civil liberties,
privacy, and the poor, and that these types of work should qualify as public service).
184. Marion County, Oregon pursued such a strategy in 1982. UPI, May 29, 1982,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Because Marion County had an
insufficient number of prosecutors to handle cases, private attorneys assumed
responsibility for prosecuting first-offense drunk driving cases and theft, forgery, bad
check, and criminal mischief cases involving less than $2000. Id.
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realm is inextricably tied to a lawyer's work. Out of deference
to those binding ties, lawyers must serve the community from
which they derive privileges. If society is to change, it must
be led,' and it must be reminded that we are inescapably
interdependent on each other.
8 6
CONCLUSION
In an attempt to strengthen our society by glorifying the
individual, we actually have weakened it. Civilization's
indicant is the acceptance of common values. Democratic
systems are impossible to maintain without some degree of
consensus on values, because values are the foundation of the
law and therefore determine our place as individuals relative
to society. Charles Lindblom's warning is appropriate:
"[E]ither there will be a less liberal, more collectivist polyar-
chy, or there will be no polyarchy at all.' 8 v In our eagerness
to destroy the barriers to individual liberty, we have enervated
the glue of community which holds together a polity.
Americans today seem to consider themselves free from moral
demands by the grace of value relativity.
The universal appeal of "freedom," "efficiency," and
"progress" has helped to create a society of individuals. Our
liberal democracy consequently is at risk of losing its moral
bearings. The Bar can help to give direction. Stripped of
many of its intemperances, the Bar can lead by example and
manifest the ethos of service to the community that should
distinguish it as a profession. Society needs a force that
emphasizes the virtue of selflessness. The Bar's task is to
perform that exigent service.
185. One author has claimed that lawyers are natural community leaders because
of their education and training. Max Rosen, The Social Conscience of a Lawyer, 69
IOWA L. REV. 319, 324, (1984).
186. American political tradition did not begin in Philadelphia or in Florence, but
in Athens. See WILL, supra note 6, at 164. Athenians recognized our inter-
dependence.
187. LINDBLOM, supra note 40, at 166. Lindblom uses "polyarchy" interchangeably
with "democracy," but prefers "polyarchy" because it is more suggestive of the
distribution of decision-making power in liberal democracies. See id. at 132.
